

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
(Thursday, 16 April at Augusta, Georgia)



On Wednesday afternoon at 4:00 p. m., April 15, I flew with General Goodpaster to Augusta. From the airport we drove to the President's cottage because General Goodpaster had some packages to deliver to Mrs. Eisenhower. After arrival at the cottage General Goodpaster and I were asked to come in and join the President and Mrs. Eisenhower and Mr. William Robinson. We stayed about an hour. In the course of this time the President asked General Goodpaster and me to work with Mr. Hagerty later in the evening on the question of the timing of and arrangements for the appointment of Mr. Herter as Secretary of State.

General Goodpaster and I went to the Richmond Hotel where we had dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Hagerty and Mr. Arrowsmith. After dinner General Goodpaster, Mr. Hagerty and I went to General Goodpaster's room where Mrs. Whitman joined us. We discussed the adequacy of Dr. Wainright's medical report; the question of whether it should be publicly released; when the appointment should be announced; and whether Mr. Herter should come to Augusta at the time of the announcement. We all were agreed that the announcement should be made at the earliest possible date, and no later than Saturday morning. We were also agreed that if the final report of the doctors could be available in time, the announcement of Mr. Herter's appointment could be made on Friday. There remained the necessity of making public the exchange of letters between the President and Mr. Dulles prior to the announcement of Mr. Herter's appointment.

On Thursday, 17 April at 7:30 a.m., Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster and I joined the President for breakfast. After breakfast we retired to the President's office where the four of us discussed for a while the timing and the arrangements for the announcement of the appointment of the new Secretary of State. After this topic had been covered, Mr. Hagerty and General Goodpaster left the President's office and I took up the following matters:

1. IRAQ. I informed the President that subject to his approval we had scheduled a special meeting for Friday morning, April 17 under the chairmanship of the Vice President, to discuss Iraq. I reminded him that he had directed a study of Iraq under the leadership of the Acting Secretary of State and that I had communicated this directive by memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense under date of April 3. I reported that the State Department had prepared a staff paper which had not yet been coordinated with the other agencies concerned. I said to the President that I was concerned about the urgency of the problem and that I did not feel that his directive had been carried out in just the manner he had wished.



I pointed out to the President that because of the unusual burdens of the Acting Secretary of State it probably had been physically impossible for him to convene a meeting of the heads of the departments and agencies concerned. On the other hand, I expressed the view that the matter of reaching a coordinated interdepartmental position had not been pressed as vigorously as his directive required and as circumstances dictated.

In the meantime, I reported to the President, there also had developed considerable unrest by high government officials, specifically including the Vice President and the Secretary of the Treasury, about the Iraq situation. Additionally, there have been some new developments including an apparent changing attitude on the part of the Turkish Government.

I indicated to the President I did not expect any particular action out of the meeting although I would recommend that there be directed the formation of an Interdepartmental Group to pursue the Iraq matter as a matter of urgency, with frequent reports to the Council.

The President felt that it was desirable to have the meeting and left to my discretion whether it should be considered an NSC meeting. The notice which had been sent out with respect to the meeting is attached.

2. FOUR ALTERNATIVES STUDIES. I reported to the President that the studies had been completed by State, Defense, JCS and CIA and that I had arranged a meeting on Saturday morning April 11 of the heads of the four agencies, each of whom had been accompanied by several members of their staffs. Mr. Murphy had represented State as

the senior officer present, and General Cabell had represented Mr. Allen Dulles.



There was a general discussion of the two papers and the question of when and how they should be presented to the President. General Twining urged very strongly that in any presentation to the President, the military study not be put forward in any summary form. He felt that there could be a distortion in an effort to summarize and to draw conclusions from a paper which did not itself contain conclusions. There was general agreement with General Twining on this point. On the other hand there was also a general agreement that the non-military paper could be summarized and that a summary might be presented to the President.

I expressed to the group the hope that a presentation might be made to the President on Thursday, April 16, and indicated that time had been reserved in Augusta for that purpose. However, after some discussion the group was unanimously of the view that both of the studies should go to General Norstad in his capacity as the senior American commander for consideration and comment before the papers were presented to the President. It was decided that the papers would go to him that afternoon with officer couriers who were planning to make the strip in any event and that if his comments were received in time they might be presented to the President on April 16. However, the judgment of most of those present seemed to be that the President should first have an opportunity to see the papers and then should decide whether he wanted a presentation.

In the meeting there was also discussed the question of making the papers available to the Tripartite group. General Twining particularly felt that this was important in order to "smoke out" the positions of the French, British and Germans. Others agreed that this was desirable although I insisted that this not be done until after the President had had an opportunity to consider the matter.

I indicated to the President that General Norstad's comments had been expected on April 15 but had not been received by the time of my departure for Augusta. I said that I agreed with the views of the JCS that they should have an opportunity to digest and comment on any Norstad comments before the documents were transmitted to the President. I explained to him therefore that although I had the documents in question in my possession, I would not at this time present them.

I pointed out to the President that what would come to him would be the military study on the four alternatives which would be more than 30 pages in length and would not contain a summary. He would also receive the non-military study which would be approximately the same length but with a summary which would be only a few pages in length. He would also have General Norstad's comments and any JCS reaction to them. I expressed to the President my view that it was unfair to him to simply dump these papers on his desk without arranging for a presentation and a discussion of them with him and that in any event it seemed to me a meeting with the principals was indicated because of some serious splits in intelligence views on which the studies were based.

The President indicated that he would like to have such a meeting but would be glad to receive the papers.

3. FOUR-POWER WORKING GROUP. I informed the President that I had examined carefully into the differences between State and Defense relating to the positions to be taken by the United States in the Four-Power Working Group in the forthcoming Ministers Conference on April 29, and the forthcoming conference with the Soviet Union on May 11. I said that some of the differences apparently had been resolved. Among them one related to the special treatment of Berlin, and another had been a question of the "agency concept" which Defense still resisted. However, I pointed out to the President that I felt that decisions had already been taken in this respect.

However, I said to the President that although I was not sure of my ground, I felt there were remaining serious potential differences in the field of disarmament relating to the question of whether the 1957 disarmament "package" policy was to be changed. The President said that he would want to know about these differences, and also about any actions which would in effect change disarmament policy, and directed me to have a study made which would indicate the respects in which it was proposed by the State Department to deviate from existing policy.

4. CONTINGENCY PLANNING. I reported to the President that I saw no immediate problems in this regard.

5. OKINAWA. I reminded the President that he had on January 19 agreed as to the need for a timely report on the results of the study as to the feasibility of concentrating U.S. military installations in



Okinawa in a single area. I pointed out to the President that it had been contemplated that the Secretary of Defense would make an oral report to the Council at the meeting when the U.S. Overseas Bases Report by State and Defense was scheduled for discussion. This report has been deferred for a number of Council meetings. I reported to the President I had made a very recent inquiry as to the status of this study and had been informed that it would not be available until sometime in August. I expressed the view that it was unnecessary that this length of time be involved and it appeared to me as though the Defense Department was seeking to prepare a voluminous report which would simply justify their previous position.



The President agreed that this was probably the case but decided that in view of the fact that the study was in process he would not insist on having it earlier than the date that Defense had indicated.

6. WHITE PAPER. I reported to the President generally on the results of our meetings with the consultants in the review of basic national security policy.

I told him that I had asked about half the consultants whether after studying the intelligence reports and reading the basic paper, they felt that the often repeated charges were sound that the government has no national strategy against international communism. I also asked them if they felt this to be the case what they would suggest to make a strategy more definitive and clear. In each case, I reported to the President, the consultants had no observations about the overall strategy except of course disagreeing in one way or another in some of the details of the language of the paper. However, there was almost a unanimous and spontaneous recommendation that the paper in some way be declassified and published as a government document. I told the President that of the 11 consultants with whom this was discussed only two had reservations, and that interestingly enough the two were Robert Cutler and Dillon Anderson, whose concern was simply the matter of protecting the integrity of the NSC. The President well understood this.

I told the President that the Planning Board had discussed at considerable length this kind of recommendation and the consensus was that it would be a good undertaking if the President approved it. Without seeking to reach agreement on details, the Planning Board felt that the paper could be used by the President in perhaps two or three major addresses at an appropriate time, and possibly linked as a matter of timing to the international conferences to take place in the

ensuing months. I reported that the Planning Board also felt that without indicating that this was an NSC paper with a particular number, it should nevertheless be made clear that the paper represented recorded policy developed at the highest level of Government.

The President felt that he would be very much interested in seeing the draft and approved the project in principle, without however committing himself to the precise use of the document. He did wish it to be made clear in any document and in any use of it that this had been the basic approach to policy throughout his Administration.

7. TEST SUSPENSION. I reported to the President very briefly on the meeting held at the State Department on Wednesday, 15 April of his Interdepartmental Committee. This meeting concerned itself with the Macmillan suggestion for a test moratorium which the President had asked Acting Secretary of State Herter to examine with care. I said to the President that I did not wish to report officially the results of the meeting to him for the reason that this should be done by Acting Secretary Herter. However, I told the President that agreement had been reached in the meeting in principle on a report to him and that it was in the process of refinement and that no doubt it would be presented to him soon after his return to Washington. I felt that he was entitled to know, however, that the unanimous view was that it would be unwise to adopt the Macmillan proposal. The President said he was inclined to think that this "unanimous view" was a wrong one but agreed that he should discuss it with Secretary Herter.



Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

